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Heenan: Corporate Avoidance of Liability Through Bankruptcy and Corporate Law

ARTICLE

GRACEFUL MANEUVERING: CORPORATE
AVOIDANCE OF LIABILITY THROUGH
BANKRUPTCY AND CORPORATE LAW
John C. Heenan*

Corporations are essentially persons under the law. Clearly, this

Court would not recognize an individual's attempt to shield
himself from . . . liability for previous wrongful conduct simply
because after committing the wrong and leaving the state, he had
married, changed his name, or engaged in some other cosmetic
alteration. 1

I.

INTRODUCTION

The law treats a corporation as though it were a person,
2
offering it nearly all of the same rights as a human being.
* J.D. University of Montana School of Law. John C. Heenan currently clerks for
the Honorable Richard F. Cebull. This article was the winner of the 2003 Roscoe Hogan
Environmental Law Essay Contest.
1. Pl.'s Br. in Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 26, Priest v. W.R. Grace & Co.
(Mont. 11th Dist. 1999) (No. DV-99-4) [hereinafter "Grace brief'].
2. 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7, 414-15 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 1999); see also Trs. of Dartmouth
Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1810) ("A corporation is an artificial
being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the mere
creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation
confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence."); see generally
Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational Corporations, 15
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Although a corporation has a legal existence, an important
distinction between a corporation and a human being is that the
corporation lacks a commensurate physical existence. 3 The
effect of this lack of a physical existence is that a corporation
becomes a shape-shifter, able to change and discard legal
personas with an ease that no human, no matter how clever, can
match.
Corporations are creatures of the law; only the law can
prevent corporations from changing legal personas. Yet, the law
increasingly has turned its back to this responsibility. When
corporations are faced with the prospect of substantial
liabilities, they are able to use the law to avoid their duties
through clever legal maneuvering. This article explores how
corporations manipulate the law in order to avoid liability for
their actions. Specifically, Part II of this article examines the
actions of one corporation, W.R. Grace & Co. (Grace), and
illustrates how corporations are using the law to avoid liability.
Part III examines corporate law in a broader context, discussing
aspects of the law that have developed to protect creditors and
the reasons why current legal protections are insufficient. Part
IV provides a range of solutions to the current laws with an eye
towards protecting involuntary creditors and assigning
responsibility. These solutions include, among others, changes
to the current laws regarding limited liability, corporate powers,
and "piercing the corporate veil." Finally, Part V concludes with
a vision of the law designed to burden corporations with
responsibilities commensurate with their rights.
II. W.R. GRACE IN LIBBY, MONTANA: THE ART OF AVOIDANCE
Our first order of priority is to insure the safety of everyone who
works for us and everyone who comes in contact with our
4
products.

DEL. J. CORP. L. 283 (1990), and Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal:
Corporationsand the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577 (1990) (offering an excellent
survey of the history and modern interpretation of corporate rights).
3. 1 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 2, § 3 ("Much of the difficulty of formulating a
definition of a 'corporation' lies in the etymology of the word, which signifies a 'body,'
primarily fleshy and tangible.").
4. Paul J. Norris, Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer, W.R. Grace &
Co., Environment, Health & Safety, Commitment to CareS, available at
http://www.grace.comthtml/enviro.html. Mr. Norris's statement is prominently featured
on the company's website regarding Grace's "Commitment to Care®" program, a
program which "lays out [Grace's] principles and practices to protect the health and
safety of [its] employees and the communities [it] work[s] in." Id.
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A. Libby and the Mine
Libby, Montana, is a town of roughly 3,000 people located in
For more than a century, Libby was
Northwest Montana.
considered a "company town." Most of the town's residents drew
their livelihoods from the local sawmill or the vermiculite mine
A local company,
outside of town on Zonolite Mountain. 5
Zonolite Co., opened the vermiculite mine at Zonolite Mountain
in the early 1920's and operated it until 1963 when Grace
purchased the mine.6 Even during Zonolite Co.'s tenure as
owner of the mine, studies had been published firmly linking
exposure to asbestos with severe lung diseases. The studies
indicated that tremolite, the type of asbestos found at Zonolite
Mountain, was particularly dangerous. 7 Although Zonolite Co.
executives knew of the threat, they did nothing to reduce the
risk.8 In 1955, an internal company memo discussed "the
dangers of exposing our employees to asbestos."9 In 1959,
Zonolite Co. ordered chest x-rays for 130 workers. 10 The x-rays
indicated that more than a third of the films were judged
"abnormal," with many showing early signs of asbestosis. 11 "The
12
affected employees were never told the results."
In April of 1963, Grace acquired Zonolite Co. and its Libby
vermiculite operation. Pursuant to the transaction, Zonolite Co.
shareholders acquired shares in Grace, Zonolite Co. was

5. Maryanne Vollers & Andrea Barnett, Libby's Deadly Grace, MOTHER JONES,
May/June 2000, available at http://www.motherjones.com/news.feature/2OOO/O5/libby.
html. The mine was closed by Grace in 1990, and the sawmill closed in 2001.
6. Id. By acquiring Zonolite Co., Grace incurred all of its liabilities.
7. Id. ("Vermiculite itself is harmless: The problem is that the layers of indigenous
rock where it is found almost always contain asbestos, exposure to which has [been]
definitively linked to several fatal lung diseases for more than 70 years. The vermiculite
deposit outside Libby is particularly dangerous because it is laced with tremolite, the
most toxic form of asbestos. Tremolite's long fibers are like fishhooks. They work their
way into soft lung tissue, and they never come out."); see also MICHAEL BOWKER, FATAL
DECEPTION: THE UNTOLD STORY OF ASBESTOS 50 (Rodale 2003) (noting that the asbestos

manufacturing industry was well aware of the dangers of asbestos by at least the 1930's,
and citing to an occupational disease report published in National Underwriter
magazine, which concluded that "any process involving asbestos are considered
especially hazardous, for the asbestos fibers appear to be difficult to expel from the
lungs." Thus, by even the early 1930's, many insurance companies had already begun
refusing to insure asbestos workers.).
8. Vollers & Barnett, supra note 5.
9. Id.
10.

Id.

11.
12.

Id.
Id.
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dissolved, and Grace assumed all of Zonolite Co.'s liabilities. 13
Unfortunately, Grace's concern for the Libby miners was not any
better than its predecessors. From the time that Grace acquired
the mill, it knew it had a problem. As one company official
wrote in 1969:
[O]ur recent experience at Libby . . . may well create for us a
significant financial liability. We also should be concerned with
the obligation to our employees; namely, permitting them to
perform their services under working conditions which we have
good reason to believe are hazardous. 14

Another internal memo dated January 5, 1968 suggested a
method for dealing with these "exposed" employees. The memo
stated, "[t]hese employees, as far as we know, are not presently
disabled. If we minimize their exposure ... chances are we may
be able to keep them on the job until after they retire, thus
precluding the high cost of total disability."'15 Grace's plan was
to keep sick employees just well enough to continue working.
Despite the clear health threats which the mine posed to
Grace's employees and the town of Libby, Grace estimated that
the mine released at least 5000 pounds of asbestos from the
town's processing plant each day. The company did nothing.
"Until the mid-1970's, the vermiculite mined in Libby was
processed in the 'dry mill,' a place so dusty that workers often
couldn't see their hands on their brooms." 16 Despite the high
amounts of dust to which the workers were exposed, Grace
refused to provide showers on the premises. Consequently, the
workers brought the asbestos-laden dust home with them,
17
exposing their families to the dangerous fibers as well.

13. Grace brief, supra note 1, at 3.
14. Erica Schenck Smith, Residents Blame Libby Mine for Illnesses, MISSOULIAN, Oct.
14, 1999, available at http://www.missoulian.com/specials/fallfromgrace.
Grace's
knowledge of the workers' problems is evident in several other Grace documents as well.
For example, a November 25, 1967, letter from a Grace executive to the company's
insurer states that a local radiologist had been conducting studies of the mine's workers
and that "his studies most certainly indicate there to be present a great deal of lung
abnormalities among the employees, far in excess of the percentage of the ordinary
population," and thus Grace "did indeed have a severe problem, and that [Grace] might
expect a good many claims involving asbestos." BOWKER, supra note 7, at 33-35.
15. Id. at 38.
16. Vollers & Barnett, supra note 5.
17. Id. In 1983, Grace decided not to spend $373,000 on showers, uniforms, and paid
overtime. The following year, Grace finally issued coveralls to its mill employees. Id.
Grace made this cost-cutting decision despite the fact that legal documents would show
that by that time "coldly calculated actuarial tables were being developed [by Grace] to
consider the deaths of not only the employees but their families as well." BOWKER, supra
note 7, at 41.
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As knowledge of the dangers of absestos became more
widespread, Grace worked to forestall the inevitable.
For
example, in 1980, OSHA officials announced they would conduct
a health study of the Libby workers.18 In response, Grace
officials circulated an internal memo discussing whether it was
best to "obstruct and block" the study, "be slow, review things
extensively, and contribute to delay," or "attempt to apply
influence." 19 By the late 1980's, however, the writing was on the
wall. With virtually no market demand for asbestos, Grace
began to shut things down.
This included not just the
dismantling of the mine, mill, and processing building, but also
planning for how to deal with the town of Libby. Residents were
dying from lung diseases in ever increasing numbers, 20 and
people were beginning to realize the extent of the environmental
damage. 2 ' Apparently, Grace was just as forthcoming and
cooperative with the EPA as it was with the other regulators
and its Libby workers. As the EPA's lead field coordinator in
Libby later opined, "[tlhey lied to us, interfered with us, and
have never acknowledged what they did here to the people of
Libby.... Grace is the most evil company I've ever dealt with.
22
They are Satan in corporate clothes."
During the 1990's, with asbestos suits on the rise
nationwide, Grace began to circle its wagons and formulate a
plan for how to deal with those who had become sick or died as a

18. Vollers & Barnett, supra note 5.
19. Id.
20. Id. (By May of 2000, nearly 100 workers had died from asbestos-related illnesses).
See also BOWKER, supra note 7, at 205 (noting that EPA tests conducted in 2000 revealed
that nearly 20% of the residents of Libby had abnormal lung x-rays, meaning they had
an asbestos-related disease). Among the former mine workers, the rate was 48%. "One
former Grace employee noted, it turned out to be more dangerous for the men to work at
the mine than it was for soldiers in WWII to land on Normandy Beach on D-Day." Id.
Currently, over 1500 people in Libby and the surrounding area have asbestos damage to
their lungs. Id. at 233.
21. See generally BOWKER, supra note 7. The EPA arrived in Libby in 1999 after
residents protested Grace's claims that the mine had been reclaimed and that the
company should thus have its reclamation bond returned. Id. When EPA agents arrived
in Libby and tried to assess the extent of the asbestos exposure in Libby, they learned
that "[t]he vermiculite had been used in gardens, attics, walls, on driveways, and as fill
around pipes and underground tanks-even as an ingredient in cookies." Id. at 195.
Vermiculite was also donated by Grace for use on Libby baseball fields, tracks, and
school playgrounds. Id. at 294. The extent of the environmental damage in Libby is best
summarized by the EPA's on-site environmental scientist, Dan Thornton, who noted that
"[g]iven the housing costs in northwestern Montana, it would have been less expensive to
demolish the town and cap and contain it than [it would be to] to clean it up." Id. at 305.
22. Id.
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result of the company's actions in Libby. What emerged was a
two-pronged approach by Grace. The first prong was to deal
with current litigation. To that end, Grace settled cases in
which an acceptable figure could be reached with the victims
and vigorously defended those in which such a figure could not
be reached. 23 The second prong involved insulating the company
and its shareholders from an ever-growing list of involuntary
creditors through a complicated series of corporate maneuvers
designed to separate Grace from its assets.
B. Graceful Maneuvering:Prelude to a Bankruptcy
As Grace became aware of its potential liability for the
illnesses and deaths of more and more people, it began to
formulate a methodical plan for protecting its assets. As early
as the late 1970's, the company was searching for a way to avoid
liability for its actions. For example, on May 24, 1977, a Grace
employee sent an internal memo which provided in part:
Considering the large potential liability that results from the sale
of products that contain even a small amount of contaminate
defined by the government as carcinogen [tremolite asbestos], it is
reasonable to question whether there are alternatives to the
proposed action. Our exposure to lawsuits cannot be ignored ....
[An] obvious alternative would be to seek divestment of the
business .... 24

A 1985 Grace memo was more explicit, discussing the
possibility of "setting business up as a subsidiary or in some
other legal form to distance [it] from Grace assets."25
1. 1988 Reorganization
Grace began to put its plans into action in 1988. Prior to
that year, the company known as "W.R. Grace & Co." had been a

23. Smith, supra note 14. Almost every settlement between Grace and the affected
workers included a confidentiality agreement precluding the victim from publicly
discussing the incident or the terms of the settlement. Id. This kept media and public
attention away from the mounting tragedy. Id. When defending against the suits,
Grace's attorneys argued variously that the company did "what it was legally obligated
to do in an era when regulations involving asbestos were evolving along with the
knowledge about its dangers," and that the victims were contributorily negligent. Id.
"Children who played in piles of mine waste, people who used waste vermiculite in their
gardens, workers who did not wear required respirators and smokers must all accept
some blame," Grace attorneys contended. Id.
24. Grace brief, supra note 1, at Exhibit "A" (Aff. of Professor Sally Weaver 28).
25. Id.
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single, shareholder-owned corporation for almost a century. 26
Within a decade, however, the company would be a shell of its
former self, divested of almost three-quarters of its assets by its
shareholders and various "Grace" subsidiaries. The first step
came in March of 1988. Grace created "W.R. Grace & Co.-New
York," a New York corporation, and "Grace Merger Corp.," a
Connecticut corporation. 27 Grace Merger Corp. was a whollyowned subsidiary of W.R. Grace & Co.-New York, which in turn
was a wholly-owned subsidiary of W.R. Grace & Co. 28 In May of
1988, Grace Merger Corp. and W.R. Grace & Co. merged, after
which the surviving corporation changed its name to W.R. Grace
& Co.-Conn. 29 At the same time, W.R. Grace & Co.-New York
changed its name to W.R. Grace & Co. and succeeded the
historical W.R. Grace as the primary, publicly-traded Grace
corporation. 30 The result of the various 1988 transactions was
that W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. became a wholly owned subsidiary
of the new W.R. Grace & Co. 31 The new W.R. Grace & Co.
continued to own all of the same assets and consisted of all of
32
the same shareholders as the former W.R. Grace & Co.
1988 Pre-Reorganization:
Grace Shareholders (100%)
W.R. Grace & Co.
(Conn. corp.)
Spec. Chem. Packaging Med. Supply

1988 Post-Reorganization:
Grace Shareholders (100%)
W.R. Grace & Co.
(NY parent corp.)
W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn.
(former W.R. Grace & Co.)
Spec. Chem. Packaging Med. Supply

26. Hoover's Company Profiles, W.R. Grace & Co. (Dec. 4, 2003), available at
www.hoovers.com. W.R. Grace & Co. grew from the businesses of Irishman William R.
Grace, who, in 1854, left Ireland to charter ships in Peru. By the 1880's, William R.
Grace was the mayor of New York City. After William's death in 1904, W.R. Grace & Co.
was managed by son Joseph until 1945, then by grandson Peter until 1993. Grace's
management by son Peter is a story in and of itself. Peter Grace was heavily involved in
politics and foreign policy, gaining the ear of numerous Presidents and other influential
political figures. See generally BOWKER, supra note 7, at 150-155.
27.

Grace brief, supra note 1, at 3.

28. Id. at 3-4.
29. Id. at 4.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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2. 1996 Reorganization
Between 1988 and 1996, the parent W.R. Grace & Co.
operated as a New York corporation and owned the subsidiary,
W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn., through which W.R. Grace & Co.
conducted its medical products, packaging, and specialty
chemical businesses. 33 At the time, one of W.R. Grace & Co.'s
largest subsidiaries was National Medical Care, Inc. (NMC), a
Delaware corporation involved in the health care industry. 34 In
September of 1996, Grace instituted another reorganization.
Grace first created another corporation, Grace Holding, Inc.,
based this time in Delaware.3 5 NMC, the W.R. Grace & Co.36
Conn. subsidiary, was then transferred to W.R. Grace & Co.
Next, W.R. Grace & Co. transferred ownership of W.R. Grace &
Co.-Conn. to Grace Holding, Inc. .3 Finally, W.R. Grace & Co.
merged with a German medical corporation, Fresenius AG, and
38
changed its name to Fresenius National Medical Care, Inc.
After the merger was complete, shareholders of the previous
W.R. Grace & Co. owned approximately 45% of the new
Fresenius National Medical Care, Inc., as well as all of the new
Grace Holding, Inc. 39 Pursuant to the terms of the Grace
Holding, Inc. merger, Grace Holding, Inc. ceased to be a
subsidiary of W.R. Grace & Co. 40 Grace Holding, Inc. then
changed its name to W.R. Grace & Co. and became the next of
the Grace entities to be the publicly-held parent corporation of
W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. 41 The result of the 1996 transfers was
that neither the new W.R. Grace & Co. nor W.R. Grace & Co.Conn. maintained any affiliation with NMC or Fresenius
National Medical Care, Inc., and all asbestos liability was placed
in W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. 42 Furthermore, all of the directors
and officers of the old W.R. Grace & Co. remained as directors

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Grace brief, supranote 1, at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Grace brief, supranote 1, at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and officers of the new W.R. Grace & Co. 43
Pre-NMC Spin-off:
Fresenius Shareholders (100%)

Post-NMC Spin-off:
Fresenius Shareholders Grace Shareholders
(55%)

(45%)

Fresenius AG
Fresenius NMC

(German corp.)

(NY parent corp. and
former W.R. Grace & Co. NY)
$3.5 billion
Grace Shareholders (100%)

Fresenius sub.

NMC

.
W.R. Grace & Co.
(NY parent corp.)

Grace Shareholders (100%)

$5.8 billion

.

4.

W.R. Grace & Co.

W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn.

(Del. parent corp.)

(former W.R. Grace & Co.)

$3.7 billion

.
Spec. Chem. Packaging Med. Supply

W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn.
(former W.R. Grace & Co.)
Spec. Chem.

Packaging

3. 1998 Reorganization
1998 brought with it a new round of corporate
reorganization by W.R. Grace & Co. First, W.R. Grace & Co.Conn. transferred all of its packaging operations to a single,
wholly-owned subsidiary named W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn.
(Cryovac). 44 W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. then transferred W.R.
Grace & Co.-Conn. (Cryovac) to W.R. Grace & Co. 45 The result
of the transfer was to extract all of the packaging operations
from W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn., leaving only the specialty

Id. at 7.
Grace brief, supra note 1, at 7.
Id.
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chemical operations. 46 W.R. Grace & Co. then transferred all
shares of W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. to a wholly-owned subsidiary
47
called Grace Specialty Chemicals, Inc.
After having spun off W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn., W.R. Grace
& Co. was only comprised of a packaging operation. It then
merged with Sealed Air Corp., a Delaware packaging
corporation, with W.R. Grace & Co. being the surviving
corporation. 48 W.R. Grace & Co. then changed its name to
Sealed Air Corp., and Grace Specialty Chemicals, Inc. changed
its name to W.R. Grace & Co., which became the newest of the
49
publicly-traded corporations to be known as W.R. Grace & Co.
The result of the 1998 transactions was that all of the
directors and officers of the pre-1998 W.R. Grace & Co.
remained as the directors and officers of the post-1998 W.R.
Grace & Co. 50 The other, more substantial result of the various
transactions between 1996 and 1999 was that, in less than four
years, W.R. Grace & Co. was able to turn a $6 billion corporation
into a $1.5 billion corporation. 51 At the same time, W.R. Grace
& Co. was able to vest itself of its asbestos liability by
transferring it to W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn., a subsidiary which
52
did not exist at the time most asbestos victims were injured.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Grace brief, supra note 1, at 9.
Id.
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Pre-Sealed Air Spin-off:
Sealed Air Shareholders (100%)

Sealed Air Corp.
(Del. corp.)

Grace Shareholders (100%)

Jk
W.R. Grace & Co.
(Del. parent corp.)
$3.5 billion

Post-Sealed Air Spin-off:
Sealed Air Shareholders Grace Shareholders
(37%)
(63%)

New Sealed Air Corp.
(Del. parent corp. and former
W.R. Grace & Co.)
$2.5 billion
S,
Old Sealed
(Del. sub.)

Air Cryovac
(former Grace-Conn. sub.)

Grace Shareholders (100%)

.a
W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn.
(former W.R. Grace & Co.)

S C

Spec. Chem. Packaging

W.R. Grace & Co.
(Del. parent corp. and former
Grace Specialty Chem.)
$1.5 billion

i.
W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn.
(former W.R. Grace & Co.)

Grace Shareholders (45%)

-a

Spec. Chem.

.a
Fresenius NMC
(NY parent corp.)
$3.5 billion

Grace Shareholders (45%)

-a

Fresenius NMC
(NY parent corp.)
$3.5 billion

C. Bankruptcy: The FinalPhase
While Grace was moving its assets out the back door, it was
putting on a good front for its former workers. On December 7,
1998, in response to the release of the film A Civil Action, Grace
CEO, Paul J. Norris, issued a letter to Grace's workers and
retirees. 53 In the letter, Norris stated:

53. Letter from Paul
employees (Dec. 7, 1998)
novel of the same name
SEATTLE P.I., Nov. 18,
/gracl9.shtml. Both tell

J. Norris, Chairman, President, and CEO, Grace, to Grace
(on file with author). The film A Civil Action was based on a
written by Jonathan Harr. The History of W.R. Grace & Co.,
1999, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/uncivilaction
the story of Grace's actions in Woburn, Massachusetts, where
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Looking back, we realize we made mistakes in how we addressed
the concerns of the Woburn community and the government
agencies regarding our past waste disposal practices .... Every

manufacturer has to deal with environmental issues from the
past; we take these responsibilities very seriously and work
proactively within the communities where we operate to do the
right thing .... I am proud to work for W.R. Grace and I know
that we . . . [use] the best practices we know to protect the en-

vironment and the health and safety of our employees and the
54
communities where we reside.
In Libby, Grace was also pledging to "do the right thing" for
those it had made ill, including pledging $250,000 a year to the
55
Libby hospital for treatment of those stricken with asbestosis.
However, Grace's good works would prove short-lived. By early

2001, its assets were reduced to roughly a quarter of its previous
total, there were over 120 pending asbestos suits from Libby,
and there were thousands more nationwide. It was heavily
56
speculated that Grace was on its way to bankruptcy court.
Against such speculations, Grace officials publicly stated on
March 22, 2001, "[w]e're not speculating.
To speculate
57
sometimes determines the conclusion."
Less than two weeks later, however, the new W.R. Grace &
Co. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the Delaware

Bankruptcy Court. The company listed total assets of $2.509
billion and total liabilities of $2.574 billion. 58 Grace's Chapter
five children and one adult died of acute lymphocytic leukemia from exposure to
chemicals in their drinking water. Id. Grace and another company were later found by
the Environmental Protection Agency to be responsible for dumping the toxic chemicals
that poisoned two of Woburn's wells. Id. Later, Grace was indicted by the Department
of Justice on two counts of lying to the EPA in 1982 about the amount of hazardous
chemicals it used at its Woburn plant. Id. In 1988, Grace pled guilty to one count and
was fined the maximum amount, $10,000. Id. Today, the penalty for that charge is
$500,000. Id.
54. Letter from Paul J. Norris, Chairman, President, and CEO, Grace, to Grace
employees (Dec. 7, 1998) (on file with author).
55. Continuously Improving Performance in Environment, Health & Safety, W.R.
Grace & Co., at http://www.grace.comlhtmllenviro.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
Grace's website characterizes this $250,000 yearly allotment as a "sweeping health care
program" in Libby which "not only provides the insurance coverage needed, but supports
the medical werewithal (sic) to diagnose and treat residents through local institutions."
The effort is part of Grace's "Commitment to Care®"program.
56. Kathleen McLaughlin, Litigants Fear Possible Grace Bankruptcy, MISSOULIAN,
March 22, 2001, available at http://www.missoulian.com/articles/2001/03/22/export28160.txt.
57. Id.
58. Memorandum from Montana Atty. Gen. Mike McGrath, to Montana Governor
Judy Martz 16 (Aug. 13, 2001) (on file with author).

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol65/iss1/4

12

2004
GRACEFUL
MANEUVERING
Heenan: Corporate Avoidance
of Liability
Through Bankruptcy and Corporate Law

11 filing included sixty of Grace's seventy-six domestic
subsidiaries and affiliates. Absent from the filing were Grace's
now legally independent international subsidiaries and
59
affiliates.
By its own admission, Grace sought Chapter 11 protection
due to its potential liability arising from asbestos-related tort
claims. 60 As Grace CEO Paul Norris stated, "We believe that the
state court system for dealing with asbestos claims is broken,
and that Grace cannot effectively defend itself against
unmeritorious claims. The best forum available to Grace to
achieve predictability and fairness in the claims settlement
process is through a federal court-supervised Chapter 11
filing." 61 Norris also added:
Grace is a fundamentally sound company with strong cash flow.
We have a clear leadership position in all of our major markets...
Over the past several years, the senior management and
employees together have led the Company to many significant
achievements, including streamlining the Company's operations..
• .We are confident that . . . the Company can leverage its

inherent value and strong cash flow to emerge
from reorganization
62
as a strong, financially sound enterprise.
By filing for Chapter 11 protection, Grace was able to
immediately place all of its assets and liabilities under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Delaware. Thus, the only way that creditors, including the
hundreds of Libby victims, could seek recovery was now through
the Bankruptcy Court.
The reaction of Libby victims to the Chapter 11 filing was
less than enthusiastic.
As one Libby resident commented:
"They've pulled the ultimate punch. They are going to get out of
the responsibility for paying for the town they destroyed. If they
are allowed to go bankrupt, somebody's going to have to clean
this town up, and it's going to be the state or federal
government."63 Another poignant summation of Grace's filing
59. Id. 115.
60. Grace Files Chapter 11, Says Asbestos Claims System Broken, MISSOULIAN, Apr.
2, 2001, available at http://www.missoulian.com/articles/200104/02/export28458.txt.
Mr. Norris did not comment on whether or not he considered any of the hundreds of
claims brought by Libby workers and residents to be "unmeritorious." Id.
61. Id.
62. Press Release, W.R. Grace & Co., W.R. Grace & Co. Files Voluntary Chapter 11
Petition to Resolve Asbestos Claims (Apr. 2, 2001), available at http://www.grace.com/
htmYreorg/pressrel.html.
63. Ironically, the reactions of Montana's politicians were more sympathetic.
Montana's governor, Judy Martz, stated that "[w]hile I can certainly understand and
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came from a local newspaper editor, who noted that "[t]he
infinite harm suffered by people exposed to [Grace's] asbestos
will be transformed into a finite and affordable amount of
64
money."
The spat of blame placed on "trial lawyers" for "clogging up
the legal system" was part of a well-financed effort by Grace and
other asbestos manufacturers to refocus the blame for the
asbestos fallout.6 5 Such a strategy was conducted, according to
Bowker, because the asbestos victims themselves "don't usually
make effective promotable villains." 66 Thus, the industry turned
to trial lawyers, seeking to cast them as the parties inhibiting
just and speedy resolution of claims. 67 The "clogging up the
courts argument" is repeatedly made despite the fact that,
according to the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, on
average fewer than seventy asbestos-related lawsuits actually go
68
to trial annually in state and federal courts.
D. CreditorReaction: FraudulentTransfer Claims Against
Grace
It did not take long for Grace's creditors, including the
government and the hundreds of asbestos victims, to realize the
extent of Grace's decade-long process and what it meant to
them. Realizing that they would receive pennies on the dollar
69
under Grace's Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Plan, tort creditors
sought to invalidate the company's previous transfers, including
its divestiture of the lucrative National Medical Care, Inc. and
Cryovac subsidiaries.
In 2002, the Official Committee of
Asbestos Personal Injury Claimants and the Official Committee
support W.R. Grace's efforts to remain solvent beneath the weight of claims against
them by asbestos victims across the country, I want to make sure that Libby residents
are not left holding the bag so that trial lawyers and others may benefit at their
expense." Kathleen McLaughlin, Officials Push for Grace to Keep Obligations to People of
Libby, MISSOULIAN, April 3, 2001, available at http://www.missoulian.comarticles/
2001/04/03/export28481txt. Montana Senator Conrad Burns also sought to refocus the
blame, pointing the finger at "trial lawyers and frivolous lawsuits." Id.
64. Editorial, Forget Accountability; It's Only Business, MISSOULIAN, Apr. 4, 2001,
available at http://www.missoulian.com/articles/2001/04/export28509.txt.
65.

BOWKER, supra note 7, at 271.

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. The list of creditors included not just Libby workers but also thousands of
consumers exposed to asbestos by Grace's products. Additionally, the EPA was listed as
a creditor because of the millions in clean-up expenses it will incur to remediate the
mine and the town of Libby.
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of Asbestos Property Damage Claimants brought suit in the
Delaware bankruptcy court to invalidate Grace's previous
transfers.7 0 The United States, through the Department of
Justice, subsequently filed a motion to intervene in bankruptcy
litigation against W.R. Grace & Co. in an effort to recover funds
that had been diverted to spin-off companies prior to Grace's
71
bankruptcy filing.
Not surprisingly, neither Grace nor the companies which
received the benefit of its transfers, Sealed Air and Fresenius,
72
felt that there was anything improper about the transfers.
Sealed Air and Fresenius were owned in large part by Grace
shareholders. Sealed Air, for example, issued the following
statement: "The 1998 transaction by which the Cryovac business
of Grace was combined with Sealed Air was an arm's-length
transaction negotiated in good faith between two independent
companies after considering all relevant issues including Grace's
73
solvency under applicable law."
However, by November of 2002, millions of dollars had
already been spent on litigation 74 and there was no end in sight.
Accordingly, both Sealed Air Corporation and Fresenius Medical
Care AG announced that they each had reached agreements in
principle with representatives of the asbestos creditors
committees to settle claims of fraudulent transfer in the Chapter
11 proceedings of W. R. Grace & Co. 75 Under the terms of the
agreement, fraudulent conveyance and other claims raised on

70. 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (2000) directs the U.S. bankruptcy trustee to appoint a
committee of unsecured creditors as soon as practicable after a Chapter 11 filing. 11
U.S.C. § 1123 (2000), in turn, requires that claims be classified by the Chapter 11 plan
and that the plan afford the same treatment to all members of a given class. The
creation of separate committees to represent asbestos personal injury claimants and
property damage claimants is a standard Chapter 11 device first employed during the
1982 bankruptcy of Johns-Manville, then the world's largest asbestos producer. Under
this device, the committees are each to be recognized as entities independent from the
company.
71. Feds Seek Return of Funds from W.R. Grace, DAILY INTER LAKE, May 27, 2002,
available at http://www.dailyinterlake.com/NewsEngine/SelectStory.AD.tpl?command=
search&db=news.db&eqskudata=1-810174-96&search-var=05/27/2002.
72. See, e.g., BOWKER, supra note 7, at 268 ("The Sealed Air Corporation and other
defendants denied all charge and vowed to defend their interests 'vigorously."').
73. Sealed Air Corporation Comments on Ruling, BUSINESS WIRE, July 30, 2002,
available at http://www.findarticles.com/cf-dls/mOEIN/2002_July-30/89851026/pllarticle.
jhtml.
74. See, e.g., In re W.R. Grace & Co., 285 B.R. 148, 153-54 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002)
(parties fees and expenses to date totaled in excess of $16.7 million).
75. Sealed Air Posts Loss on Asbestos Charges, REUTERS, Jan. 28, 2002, available at
http://www.reuters.comnewsArticle.jhtml?type=businessNews&storyID=21 26350.
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behalf of asbestos claimants were dismissed.7 6 Both Fresenius
and Sealed Air received protection against all existing and
potential future asbestos-related claims upon confirmation of
the W.R. Grace & Co. bankruptcy reorganization plan. 77 In
turn, Fresenius and Sealed Air agreed to pay $115 million 78 and
$583 million, 79 respectively, to the W.R. Grace bankruptcy estate
upon plan confirmation. To date, Grace's Bankruptcy Plan has
yet to be confirmed.
E. Aftermath
Although one might take the Fresenius and Sealed Air
settlements as a sign that current corporate law does, in fact,
work, the reality is quite the opposite. Under Grace's Chapter
11 filing, its liabilities exceeded its assets by some $500
million.8 0 This half-billion dollars in excess of liabilities did not
even take into account asbestos-related claims, 61,000 of which
had been filed against Grace by the time the bankruptcy
proceedings were instituted.8 1 Given the fact that, (1) treatment
for the average asbestos-related disease can cost tens or even
hundreds of thousands of dollars, 2 and, (2) the number of claims
filed before 2001 does not even approach the ultimate number of
asbestos victims to whom Grace is responsible,8 3 it is
inconceivable that Grace's current Chapter 11 plan will be able
to fully compensate all personal injury tort creditors.8 4 Even if

76. Press Release, Fresenius Medical Care, Fresenius Medical Care Announces
Definitive Agreement to Settle Fraudulent Conveyance and All Other W.R. Grace
Bankruptcy Related Issues; The Company Confirms Adequate Accrued Reserve (Feb. 12,
2003), available at http://www.fresenius.de/e/scripts/04-1-show.asp?nr=501.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. REUTERS, supra note 75.
80. Id.
81. Memorandum from Atty. Gen. Mike McGrath, supra note 58, at
84-85.
82. See, e.g., BOWKER, supra note 7. For example, if the average asbestos claim were
valued at $50,000 (a conservative estimate), then the cost of treating 61,000 claimants
would be $3.05 billion dollars.
83. See, e.g., id. The dormancy period for asbestos-related diseases can be as much as
forty or fifty years. Thus, it is inestimable just how many people will ultimately be found
to be stricken with asbestos-related diseases as a direct result of Grace's activities.
However, for the sake of pure speculation, assume that Grace is found to be liable for the
asbestos-related diseases of 100,000 more people; then at $50,000 per victim, Grace's
liability will be $5 billion dollars. All of these future damages, of course, will be
discharged under Grace's Chapter 11 bankruptcy plan.
84. This statement does not even take into account the millions of dollars in property
damage which has occurred because of Grace's activities in Libby.
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Grace had not proceeded through a decade of company
divestment, it is unlikely that Grace would have been able to
fully compensate its numerous victims.
However, Grace's handlers were able to successfully divest
the company of more than $4 billion in assets. By the time the
dust had settled in the creditors' lawsuits, less than 20% ($698
million) of that $4 billion had been recovered. In effect, Grace
was able to successfully divert more than $3 billion from
potential creditors. Thus, there can be no dispute that no
matter how Grace's Chapter 11 plan is resolved, the
indisputable losers will be the thousands of people whom Grace
is responsible for injuring. These victims will receive little or no
financial compensation.
III. THE "GRACE METHOD:" How CORPORATIONS AVOID LIABILITY
THROUGH CORPORATION RESTRUCTURING AND BANKRUPTCY LAW

Grace is by no means alone in its attempts to avoid liability
through asset divestiture and bankruptcy filing. Indeed, the
concept of a debtor attempting to avoid payment is anything but
new.8 5 It is a given that people and corporations will sometimes
attempt to avoid paying what they owe. Therefore, the law has
developed a series of restraints in an effort to prevent debtors
from hiding their assets from creditors. These restraints come
in the form of fraudulent conveyance law, successor liability law,
and the corporate veil piercing doctrine.8 6 Unfortunately, while
these laws prevent the most simplistic and flagrant abuses, they
are by no means flawless. Several loopholes allow debtors to
protect
assets and shield themselves
from liability.
Furthermore, increasingly savvy corporate lawyers have been
able to help corporations avoid liability while acting in complete
compliance with the law.

85. This is common within the specific realm of mass toxic torts such as Grace's. See,
e.g., Mark J. Roe, Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REV. 1 (1986)
(discussing, amongst others, Mansville Corporation's 1982 bankruptcy filing); Lynn M.
Lopucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1 (1996); Lynn M. Lopucki, Virtual
Judgment Proofing:A Rejoinder, 107 YALE L.J. 1413 (1998).
86. 15A FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 2, § 7403 (explaining the general principles of
law and the statutes governing fraudulent conveyances are based on the principle that
"corporations cannot, any more than individuals, relieve their property from the
payment of debts.").
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A. ProtectingCreditors in the Law: Fraudulent Conveyances,
Successor Liability, and the Corporate Veil PiercingDoctrine
There are three legal doctrines which have evolved in order
to protect creditors in their interactions with debtor
corporations. The first doctrine, fraudulent conveyance law,
allows a creditor to void a transaction because of its fraudulent
purpose or effect. The second doctrine, successor liability, is
similar to the law of fraudulent conveyances. This doctrine
extends the liability of a former corporation to the new entity if
a transaction is deemed fraudulent. The third doctrine, the
corporate veil piercing doctrine, allows a creditor to disregard
the corporate form and attach liability to the person or
corporation.
All three of these doctrines, while somewhat
different, have the same general purpose of protecting creditors
by preventing corporations from shielding themselves from
liability.
1. Fraudulent Conveyance Law
Fraudulent conveyance law is embodied in both federal and
state law. In the federal arena, the Bankruptcy Code addresses
fraudulent transfers and conveyances. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. §
548 invalidates transfers that are fraudulently made and
obligations that are fraudulently incurred.8 7
This Code
provision is based on the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act
(UFCA), which along with the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
88
(UFTA) provides the basis for state fraudulent conveyance law.
The UFCA and the UFTA are similar in both structure and
approach. They both consider a transfer "made or an obligation
incurred with actual
intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors"
8 9
to be "fraudulent.
There are generally two types of fraudulent transfers under
modern fraudulent conveyance law. The first type is a transfer
which is actually fraudulent. Under the UFTA, the UFCA, and
the Bankruptcy Code, a transfer committed with the actual,
subjective intent to defraud creditors is a fraudulent

87.

11 U.S.C. § 548 (2000).

88. See 15A FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 2, § 7404 ("Most jurisdictions have statutes
modeled after the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act," while "[s]ome have provisions
based on the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act.").
89. Id. (citing UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 7 (2002) and UNIF.
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(1) (2002)).
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conveyance. 90 There is rarely direct evidence of a debtor's
fraudulent intent. Therefore, actual fraudulent intent is usually
established through circumstantial evidence such as the
relationship between the transferor and the transferee. 9 1
The second type of transfer is constructively fraudulent. In
dealing with constructively fraudulent conveyances, the
Bankruptcy Code and the Acts provide for a two-element test for
determining whether a transfer is constructively fraudulent.
The first element questions whether the debtor received "less
than a reasonably equivalent value in the accused transaction." 92 The second element deals generally with the debtor's
insolvency, inquiring into whether the debtor: (i) "was engaged
or was about to engage in a business transaction for which the
remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in
relation to the business or transaction"; (ii) "intended to incur, or
believed or reasonably should have believed that [it] would
incur, debts beyond [its] ability to pay as they became due"; or
(iii) "was insolvent at the [time of the transaction] or the debtor
93
became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation."
Thus, under both the Acts and the Bankruptcy Code,
determining whether or not a conveyance is constructively
fraudulent turns on two factors. These factors include the
adequacy of consideration for the transfer and the financial
position of the debtor rather than the actual, subjective
94
intention of the transferor.
One of the most crucial issues in a constructive fraud
90. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A); UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 7 [hereinafter
UFCA]; UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(1) [hereinafter UFTA].
91. DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BANKRUPTCY AND RELATED LAW IN A NUTSHELL 220 (6th ed.
2002). See also 15A FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 2, § 7408 (citing, among others, Harris
v. Aimco, Inc., 383 N.E.2d 631 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (describing transfer of property to
children of sole director, officer, and majority shareholder of corporation fraudulent) and
U.S. Marketing Concepts, Inc. v. Don Jacobs Buick-Subaru, Inc., 547 N.E.2d 892 (Ind.
App. 1989) (holding conveyance to sole shareholder fraudulent)).
92. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B); UFCA §§ 1-6; UFTA §§ 4(a)(2), 5(a).
93. UFTA §§ 4(a)(2), 5(b). The language of 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B) is slightly
different, inquiring into whether the debtor: "(i) was insolvent or became insolvent as a
result of the transaction, or (ii) was engaged in business or was about to engage in a
business transaction for which his remaining property was unreasonably small capital,
or (iii) intended to incur or believed that he would incur debts beyond his ability to pay."
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B).
94. EPSTEIN, supra note 91, at 220. See also In re W.R. Grace & Co., 281 B.R. 852,
8521 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) ("[UFTA] Section 5 makes no mention of the debtors
knowledge or reasonableness of estimation in relation to its own insolvency. As framed
by the statute, the only question is whether the debtor was insolvent on the transfer date
or became insolvent.").
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analysis is determining whether or not the debtor was left with
unreasonably small capital after the transaction.
A
corporation's capital assets can change quickly and be difficult to
ascertain with accuracy. Thus, an important aspect of the
capitalization inquiry is on what date the capital of the
corporation should be quantified. The courts have resolved this
issue, determining:
Rather than focus on the specific date of the transaction, the
transfer will be examined in the context of a reasonable period of
time surrounding that date. Thus, the critical inquiry when
considering whether a transfer or conveyance has left a company
with unreasonably small capital is one that weighs raw financial
data against both the nature of the enterprise itself and the extent
of the enterprise's need for capital during the period in question;
therefore, it avoids the risk of ascribing undue weight to the state
of a company's balance sheet on a particular day. 95
Such an approach correctly allows the court to look at the full
impact of the transaction on the corporation's financial viability.
A second issue which arises in the constructive fraud
analysis, particularly in the mass torts context, is what
constitute "debts" for corporate solvency purposes. 96 The UFTA
defines a debt as a "liability on a claim." 97 A claim is broadly
construed to mean "a right to payment, whether or not the right
is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed,
contingent, matured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable,
secured, or unsecured." 98 In determining whether and at what
point a tort victim's injury constitutes a "claim" for liability
purposes, the courts have determined that tort victims have a
right to payment and thus a claim for solvency purposes at the
time the claimant suffers "identifiable, compensable injury."99
An increasingly important aspect of modern fraudulent
conveyance law is that courts are willing to consider claims
which, although not filed at the time of transfer, were
compensable at that date.

95. 15A FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 2, § 7405 (citing Barrett v. Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 882 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1989)).
96. This issue arises because creditors may not have filed a claim at the date of the
transaction, or even know that they have a claim on that date. This is particularly true
in the context of asbestos victims, given the fact that the asbestosis may lie dormant for
50 years or more.
97. UFTA § 1(5).
98. UFTA § 1(3).
99. In re W.R. Grace & Co., 281 B.R. at 861.
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2. Successor Liability
A doctrine which overlaps the law of fraudulent conveyances
is that of successor liability. Under the doctrine of successor
liability, the general rule is that a corporation does not assume
the debts and liabilities of a corporation whose assets it
acquires.10 0 However, one of the four generally recognized
exceptions to this rule exists when the transfer from the former
corporation to the successor corporation is made for the
fraudulent purpose of escaping liability. 10 1 Thus, where a
transfer of a corporation's assets is made for a fraudulent
purpose, the successor corporation will be burdened with the
liabilities of the corporation whose assets it acquires. The rule
of successor liability becomes important when analyzing modern
corporate restructuring. As Professor Vulkovich describes:
A frequent stratagem employed by corporate insiders is to create a
"new" corporation to which the insolvent debtor corporation
transfers, frequently through a maze of transactions, substantially
all of its assets. The insiders own the stock of the new corporation
and operate it as they did the old corporation. Meanwhile, the
debtor corporation files bankruptcy and its creditors are left to
battle over the funds that the debtor received in exchange for its
assets.102

Grace's corporate maneuvering is not only a classic example
of the "frequent stratagem" described by Professor Vulkovich,
but also a demonstration of the depths to which modern
corporations are willing to go to shield assets from creditors.
3. CorporateVeil PiercingDoctrine
Under the corporate veil piercing doctrine, courts will
"disregard the fiction of a separate legal entity when a
corporation is the mere instrumentality or agent of another
corporation or individual owning all or most of its stock." 10 3 The
effect of veil piercing is that the court refuses to recognize the
corporate entity and instead imposes liability on individual

100. See, e.g., Raytech Corp. v. White, 54 F.3d 187 (3rd Cir. 1995).
101. Id. at 192 (explaining that the four instances in which successor liability are
imposed are where: (1) the purchaser expressly or implicitly agrees to assume liability;
(2) the purchase is an actual or de facto consolidation or merger; (3) the purchaser is a
mere continuation of the seller; or (4) the transfer is for the fraudulent purpose of
escaping liability).
102. William T. Vukowich, Civil Remedies in Bankruptcy for Corporate Fraud, 6 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 439, 456-57 (1998).
103. Zaist v. Olson, 227 A.2d 552, 557 (Conn. 1967).
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shareholders for corporate debts. 0 4 The almost universal rule is
that mere stock dominance is not enough to warrant piercing,
but rather the circumstances must be such that "the controlled
corporation has, so to speak, no separate mind, will or existence
of its own and is but a mere conduit for its principal." 10 5 Factors
courts generally consider in determining whether to "pierce" the
corporate veil include: (1) the degree of control by the
shareholder, (2) undercapitalization, and (3) observance of
corporate formalities. 106 Although courts differ greatly in their
willingness to pierce the corporate veil, "[e]ven those with
conservative approaches to piercing issues agree that fraudulent
conduct by insiders is per se a significant factor in favor of
piercing."'0 7 Thus, establishing a fraudulent conveyance often
allows the creditor to reach the assets of the corporate
shareholder(s).
B. Working Within the System: Avoiding Liability Through
Technical Compliance with the Law
The laws of fraudulent conveyances, successor liability, and
corporate veil piercing are all variously formulated in an effort
to protect creditors by voiding fraudulent conveyances.
However, corporations are increasingly able to circumvent these
laws through technical compliance. Grace is one of the best
modern examples of a corporation taking deliberate steps to
comply with the law while at the same time distancing creditors
from corporate assets. Grace's corporate conveyances were so
skillfully achieved' 08 that it was difficult for creditors to clearly
establish the applicability of the laws of fraudulent conveyances
or successor liability without enduring a costly legal struggle. 109

104.

LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & PETER V. LETSoU, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS § 3.05 (3rd ed.

1998).

105. Id.
106. RIBSTEIN & LETSOU, supra note 104, at § 3.05.
107. Vulkovich, supra note 102, at 452-53.
108. See supra Part II. Properly understood, Grace was able to divest itself of two of
its most lucrative businesses- medical products (through its National Medical Care, Inc.
subsidiary) and packaging (through its Cryovac subsidiary) through hybrid mergers and
stock transfers. Both the Fresenius and Sealed Air deals allowed Grace shareholders to
"trade-in" their liability-ridden Grace shares for "clean" (no-liability attached) shares in
the asset recipients.
109. The veil piercing doctrine did not squarely apply to Grace's maneuvers because
Grace was able to quickly spin-off its lucrative subsidiaries, thus giving up any control
over them. Because Fresenius and Sealed Air were not "controlled" by Grace, the
doctrine was inapplicable.
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Even if these laws did apply, 110 the beneficiaries of Grace's
lucrative asset divestitures, Grace's shareholders, were still able
to use the time, expense, and uncertainty of litigation to achieve
a settlement of substantially less than the divested amount. As
the dust continues to settle after Grace's bankruptcy, two things
are certain: (1) Grace shareholders will come out better than
they should have, and, (2) the Libby victims will not be fully
compensated. Thus, to the extent Grace sought to distance itself
from its creditors to the benefit of its shareholders, it has
succeeded.
The method employed by Grace and others is relatively
simple."' The manner in which corporations attempt to avoid
11 2
liability is widely believed to differ according to industry.
First, the corporation systematically transfers its assets while
retaining just enough assets to comply with the law. This is
accomplished through corporate legal maneuvers such as the
formation of subsidiary corporations and the compart-

110. Because both Fresenius and Sealed Air have settled the fraudulent conveyance
claims against them, we will never know how the court would have resolved these
claims.
111. Another example of a corporation taking methodical steps to distance itself from
tort creditors through corporate reorganization occurred with Raymark Industries (now
Raytech Corp.) another former asbestos producer. As the company's New York law firm
advised the directors prior to the corporate restructuring:
It should be possible under existing case law for Raytech to acquire assets or
businesses of Raymark without thereby subjecting Raytech or such acquired
assets or businesses to liability for the asbestos-related claims against
Raymark under the doctrines of successor liability, piercing the corporate veil
or fraudulent conveyance ....
Schmoll v. ACandS, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 868, 873 (D.Or. 1988). Beginning in 1982,
through various restructuring similar to that undertaken by Grace, the corporation
attempted to systematically insulate itself from creditors. Id. at 874. The complicated
restructure, while distancing corporate assets from creditors, was designed to comply
with the letter (if not the spirit) of the law in every way. Id. at 872 After nearly a
decade, the transformation complete, the new Raytech Corp. claimed it owed no
responsibility to the numerous asbestos-victim creditors, arguing instead that Raytech
Corp. was a completely separate entity from the former Raymark Industries. Id.
Fortunately, the court found otherwise, ruling that "although the corporate restructuring meets the technical formalities of corporate form, it was designed with the
improper purpose of escaping asbestos-related liabilities," and therefore, "Raytech is a
successor in liability to Raymark Industries." Id. at 874-75.
112. See, e.g., Lopucki, supra, note 85, at 45 ("In some industries, the costs of liability
are clearly high enough to drive corporate strategy. In those kinds of industries,
judgment proofing flourishes."); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward
Unlimited Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1881 (1991) ("Increasing
exposure to tort liability has led to the widespread reorganization of business firms to
exploit limited liability to evade damage claims. The method of evasion differs by
industry.").
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mentalization of assets. After divesting itself of assets, the
corporation is able to file for bankruptcy. This fixes its overall
liability and forces the creditors to "fight over the scraps." While
theoretically simple, this two-step process creates a legally
complex web through which a creditor must climb in order to
reach the assets of the liable company. As corporations grow
more savvy in their ability to abuse current law through
technical compliance, it is clear that solutions to the current law
must be implemented if creditors are going to be truly protected.
C. FactorsEnabling CorporateLiabilityAvoidance: Limited
Liability and Parent-SubsidiaryRelationships
In order to understand how corporations like Grace are able
to avoid legal liability, it is crucial to understand two
intertwined facets of modern corporate law. The first is limited
liability. The principle of limited liability is founded on the rule
that corporate shareholders may not normally be called upon to
"use their own assets not invested in the business to pay
business debts." 1 3 Using limited liability as a tool, corporations
are able to insulate shareholders from any personal
responsibility for the corporation's actions.
The second important aspect of modern corporate law is the
parent-subsidiary relationship. The parent-subsidiary relationship is founded upon the power of corporations to be the sole
shareholders of other corporations.11 4 Corporations can own
complete equity in other corporations and corporate share115
holders are given the same rights as individual shareholders.
Therefore, the separation of each corporation within a particular
group of corporations is respected by the courts.1 1 6 In the
modern corporate arena, it has become the rule rather than the
exception for large corporations to put their risky product lines
in a subsidiary corporation "so that the limited liability of the
subsidiary might shield the parent firm from mass tort
liability." 117 Professor Roe notes that there are several reasons

113. RIBSTEIN & LETSOU, supranote 104, at § 3.03.
114. See supra Part IV(A).
115. See generally David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors,
91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565 (1991),
116. Id.
117. Roe, supra note 85, at 39.
[I]f one looks to the modern world economy, one concludes that enterprises
have increasingly chosen to organize and conduct their business operations in
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why corporations increasingly opt to do business through
subsidiary corporations, including: (1) the basic formalities of
chartering a corporation are relatively simple and cheap; (2)
there is a good chance that the subsidiary will limit the exposure
of the parent corporation; and (3) because there are virtually no
punitive aspects to modern veil piercing or fraudulent
conveyance laws, even if the parent is held liable, the
corporation will be able to force a favorable settlement by
wearing down tort claimants seeking to reach the parent.118
IV. FORCING RESPONSIBILITY IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM: SOLUTIONS

Given the actions undertaken by Grace and its progeny, it is
clear that current corporate law fails to adequately restrain
corporations from attempting to avoid liability or assure the
protection of involuntary tort creditors. This failure is the result
of granting limited liability to corporations and allowing
corporations to own complete equity in other corporations. This
Part explores the range of possible solutions available to curb
corporate liability avoidance and better protect tort creditors.
A. Remove the Dual Levels of Limited Liability Available to
Parent-SubsidiaryCorporations

One solution offered by numerous legal commentators is to
the form of a cluster of various separate corporations, rather than as a single
corporate entity. Instead of the initial atomistic corporate world living under a
perfect competition and free market model, the present century assisted the
rise of an economic order largely dominated by multinational and
multicorporate groups. Therefore, the major enterprise has typically evolved as
a complex, large-scale business network, where the different parts of a unitary
business are allocated to a group of affiliated corporations (subsidiary
corporations), global co-ordination is obtained through the submission of such
legally independent parts to a common economic strategy, and management of
the whole is exercised by headquarters (parent corporation). As a matter of
fact, of the one hundred largest economic entities in the world, 50 are nations
and 50 are multinational corporate groups.
Jose Engracia Antunes, The Liability of PolycorporateEnterprises, 13 CONN. J. INT'L L.
197, 203 (1999).
118. Roe, supra note 85, at 48-49. See also Lopucki, supra note 85, at 19-21 ("[T]he
parent-subsidiary strategy has had a major effect in the bankruptcy reorganizations of
large, publicly held companies. Its use in combination with a secured debt strategy can
defeat a company's liability entirely."). A more expansive explanation of how a spin-off
can serve the parent corporation even if piercing is assured. See Kevin M. Warsh,
Corporate Spinoffs and Mass Tort Liability, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 675, 711-18
(proving that the time period between the day of reckoning [e.g. successful veil-piercing]
and the present provides corporate shareholders with real gains because of the extra
time which the corporation is able to retain the disputed assets).
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remove the dual levels of limited liability available in the
parent-subsidiary context. 119 As a general rule, two separate
corporations are regarded as distinct legal entities even if the
stock of one is owned wholly or partly by the other. 120 This
means that in the context of parent-subsidiary relationships,
when one corporation is owned in whole or in part by another
corporation, there is a presumption of separateness that the
plaintiff must overcome. To establish liability on the part of the
parent corporation, a creditor must show that the parent
corporation is employing the subsidiary to perpetrate a fraud
21
and that this was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury.'
Absent such a showing, both the parent and the subsidiary
122
corporation are afforded limited liability.
Despite their intimate legal relationship, it is difficult for a
creditor to pierce the veil of a subsidiary corporation. 23 In
reality, courts only rarely pierce the veil to reach parent
corporations. 24 This fact is surprising since there are few
justifiable reasons for extending limited liability to parent
corporations in the first place. As Professors Ribstein and
Letsou point out, limited liability in the parent-subsidiary
context may not even be necessary. 125 Traditionally, the policy

119. The phrase "parent-subsidiary" is also clearly a simplification under current
corporate structuring. This is because there is virtually no limit to the layers of parent
and subsidiary relationships which can be granted. For example, a parent corporation
(P) can create a subsidiary (Si), which in turn creates another subsidiary (S2), which in
turn creates another subsidiary (S3). The result, then, would be that S2 would be the
subsidiary of S1, but the parent of S3.
120. 1 FLETCHER ET AL., supra note 2, § 43.
121. Id.
122.

Id.

123. RIBSTEIN & LETSOU, supra note 104, at § 3.05 (citing Robert B. Thompson,
Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1058 (1991)
(explaining that of the 1572 veil piercing cases which Professor Thompson studied, only
226 were tort cases)).
124.

Id.

125. RIBSTEIN & LETSOU, supra note 104, at § 3.05. See also Leebron, supra note 106,
at 1615 ("The argument for respecting the separateness of corporate entities is simply
that no good is achieved by not respecting it. If limited liability for corporate
subsidiaries were abolished, it would give an advantage to nonsubsidiary competitors,
and, in the long run, would simply result in elimination of the subsidiary or
conglomerate corporate form from that sector of the economy."); but see Erika Clarke
Birg, Comment, Redefining "Owner or Operator"Under CERCLA to Preserve Traditional
Notions of Corporate Law 43 EMoRY L.J. 771, 778 (1994) (arguing that a potential
advantage of limited liability in the parent-subsidiary relationship is "to encourage
corporate participation in beneficial albeit risky industries" by allowing firms to
"compartmentaliz[e] the risk of liability through separate subsidiaries."); Stephen B.
Presser, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation: Limited Liability, Democracy, and
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considerations behind limited liability were easing ownership
transfers, reducing monitoring costs, and creating market
efficiency. However, these considerations do not apply in this
context because subsidiary corporations are generally not
126
publicly traded and are actively monitored by their parent.
Furthermore, allowing limited liability at both the parent
and the subsidiary level creates a situation whereby "parents
may deliberately undercapitalize the subsidiaries, or move
assets around in such a complicated way that creditors cannot
determine the creditworthiness of each corporation."' 27 The
remedy to this problem is simple-revoke the limited liability
privilege which is currently extended
to subsidiary
corporations. 128 The result of this revocation would afford the
parent corporation and its shareholders limited liability while
denying limited liability for the subsidiary corporation. This
would prevent corporations from shielding themselves through
the use of subsidiary corporations. By extension, it would also
enable creditors to more easily monitor the transfer of assets by
the corporation.
B. Give Priorityto Involuntary Tort Creditors over Secured
Creditors in the Bankruptcy PriorityHierarchy
Under current bankruptcy law, secured creditors are given

Economics, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 148, 175 (1992) ("Presumably those who profit by reducing
the risk to the parent are the parent's shareholders, and, presumably, the more we
reduce their risk and thereby raise the potential profit to them the more we will
encourage their investment.").
126. RIBSTEIN & LETSOU, supra note 104, at § 3.05.
127. Id.
128. Several commentators have put forward solutions arguing for the complete
disregard of the parent-subsidiary distinctions in the limited liability context because of
their inapplicability to modern times. These commentators have characterized such a
theory as extending liability to the enterprise rather than the entity. PHILLIP I.
BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF
PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS § 22.03.2 (1983) (arguing that the boundary of
the enterprise should be based "on the degree of economic integration" between the
formally separate but commonly controlled components of the corporate group). See also
Antunes, supra note 117, at 207 (discussing the "polycorporate enigma" [e.g., that while
the economic forms of enterprise organizations have grown exponentially complex, the
legal forms of their organization remain stuck to a statutory model designed and
conceived exclusively for the case of single corporate enterprises] and arguing for
enterprise liability rather than entity liability); Lopucki, supra note 85, at 67 ("In its
more conservative version, enterprise liability is virtually indistinguishable from liberal
piercing of the corporate veils within corporate groups. In its more radical version, it
calls for the complete disregard of entities, leaving it to the courts to determine the scope
of the enterprise.").
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priority over unsecured involuntary creditors. 129
Professor
Lopucki argues that the reverse should be true and that
involuntary creditors should take priority. 130 Lopucki makes
this argument from an economic efficiency standpoint,
explaining as follows:
The argument is simple. As the system currently operates,
consensual creditors can contract for security. Once they have
done so, they have priority over involuntary creditors. Knowing
that they themselves will be paid in any event, the secured
creditors have grossly inadequate incentives to limit the debtor's
liability-generating activity. As a result of the encumbrance,
equity holders may also have grossly inadequate incentives to
limit the debtor's liability-generating activity. Given that there is
no one else with adequate incentives, it should be apparent that
firms whose assets are encumbered will tend to generate too much
liability. As a result, secured credit has become a fundamental
building block of strategies for the defeat of liability to involuntary
creditors. The immediate solution is to give involuntary creditors
priority over consensual creditors, including secured creditors.
That rule maximizes the probability that debtors will be forced to
pay their involuntary creditors and thus be unable to externalize
the risks of their business. Consensual creditors will not be
prejudiced. Knowing that they will be subordinate, consensual
creditors can protect themselves by selecting and monitoring their
debtors and charging a premium for those risks that they cannot
eliminate cost effectively.131

Professor Lopucki's argument is a good one. Under the
current system, secured creditors have little incentive to insure
the debtor's solvency. However, if the pecking order changed
and secured creditors were placed behind involuntary creditors,
secured creditors would have an incentive to better monitor the
actions of the corporate debtor. Proponents of the traditional
hierarchy, might argue that the very purpose of allowing
creditors to contract for security is fundamental to the capital
model. Thus, without such protection contract creditors would
be unwilling to invest in risky ventures. This argument, in the
face of the fallout in Libby, calls into question the policy of
promoting such risky ventures in the first place. Rewarding
risky behavior, in short, is a concept which may be outdated.

129. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(3) (2000) (allowing the debtor to specify the treatment of any
claims and interests impaired under the Chapter 11 plan). In the words of Prof. Epstein,
"in bankruptcy, some creditors are clearly 'more equal' than others." EPSTEIN, supra
note 91, at 309.
130. Lopucki, supra note 85, at 61-62.
131. Id.
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C. Enumerate Specific Instances When Limited Liability Should
Be Extended
132
The United States Supreme Court in Anderson v. Abbott
declared that "[l]imited liability is the rule not the exception;
and on that assumption large undertakings are rested, vast
enterprises are launched, and huge sums of capital attracted."
This rule applies even where the shareholder is simply a parent
corporation exerting sole ownership and control over its
subsidiary. While there are numerous policy reasons for the
extension of limited liability in most circumstances, 133 there are
certain instances in which limited liability does not make
rational sense. As Judge Fullam noted in Parker v. Bell
Asbestos Mines, Ltd.:

[A] distinction may be drawn between (1) carrying out the
everyday affairs of corporate business (e.g., the mining and sale of
asbestos)-the sort of activity which traditionally merits the
privilege of limitation of liability bestowed by the protective
corporate form; and (2) carrying out legal maneuvers aimed at
maximizing the limitation of liability to a point of near
invulnerability to responsibility for injury to the public. In our
view, the latter . . . constitutes an abuse of privilege, which in an
equitable analysis of competing public considerations must surely
fail. 134

Judge Fullam's criticism is correct. The legal system needs
to enumerate instances in which the privilege of limited liability
should be extended and instances in which it should not. As
Grace's actions demonstrate, the current state of corporate law,
in the hands of sophisticated corporate lawyers, is one which
allows corporations to insulate themselves to preposterous
portions. This is not why the privilege of limited liability was
created.135 Thus, in order to preempt further abuses of the
limited liability privilege, lawmakers should enumerate specific

132. 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944).
133. See, e.g., id. at 362 (listing policy reasons for limited liability including: (1)
reduced costs of risk bearing, (2) reduced monitoring costs, (3) increased liquidity, and
(4) market efficiency).
134. 607 F. Supp. 1397, 1403 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
135. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Ambiguity in Corporation Law, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L.
894, 895-96 (1997) ("Corporation law facilitates wealth creation principally by creating a
legal structure that makes it substantially cheaper for investors to commit their capital
to risky ventures .... This allows capital to subject itself to greater risk. It is the ability
to increase the degree of risk that can be rationally accepted that provides the greatest
source of the efficiency of the corporate form. Much of this utility depends upon
investors allowing themselves to be safely passive.").
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instances under which limited liability should be granted, rather
than providing a blanket liability limit to shareholders.
D. Require CorporationsEngaged in DangerousActivities to
Post Bonds and/or Carry Mandatory Insurance
Richard Posner, a strong proponent of limited liability in
the realm of contract creditors, has suggested that, in order to
remedy the harsh effects of limited liability on tort victims,
corporations engaging in dangerous activities should be required
136
to post bonds equal to the highest likely tort damage.
Similarly, other scholars have argued that corporations engaged
in dangerous activities should be required to carry liability
insurance. 13 7 As Rachel Maizes points out in her critique of
limited liability companies, "[s]ome states already require
professional LLCs to carry insurance. Do hazardous waste
disposal companies, oil and gas companies, and the like, really
pose fewer risks to society than professionals? Are those risks
less worth insuring against?"1 38 Such an analogy is hard to
dismiss.
Both of these strategies, however, contain inherent
problems. One such problem is that it is often difficult to gauge
beforehand which activities are "dangerous" enough to warrant
the posting of bonds and/or insurance. While many activities,
such as Grace's Libby mine, seem intuitively dangerous, it was
only two decades ago that Grace was successfully arguing that
there was nothing dangerous about its Libby mine or the
asbestos exposure of its workers. Similarly, tobacco use now
seems inherently dangerous, but only a few decades ago the
tobacco producers were the only people who knew of the health
Thus, the very industries
risks inherent in tobacco use.
engaging in the activity would be asked to disclose the degree of
danger which their product poses. This arrangement would
create an obvious conflict of interest and open itself up to
inherent systemic problems.
A second, related problem is that corporations engaging in
the risky behavior will inevitably attempt to downplay the

136. Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations,43 U. CHI.
L. REV. 499, 520 (1976).
137. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation,52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 101-03 (1985); Rachel Maizes, Note, Limited Liability
Companies:A Critique, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 575, 602-08 (1996).
138. Maizes, supra note 137, at 607.
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degree of danger in order to secure the lowest bond and/or
insurance premium. 139 For example, Grace posted a reclamation
bond on the Libby mine which regulators felt would be adequate
Similarly, Grace carried liability
to reclaim the site. 140
insurance while the mine was in operation. However, Grace was
able to publicly argue that the mine and the mill did not pose
any serious danger. Therefore, it was able to undercapitalize
both the amount of its bond and the amount of insurance
141
available to tort victims.
E. Shift the Burden of Prooffrom the Tort Creditor to the
Corporationwhen Applying the Veil PiercingDoctrine to
Parent/SubsidiaryCorporations
Under current law, the creditor bears the burden of proof to
show why the court ought to disregard the legal fiction of
separate entities and pierce the corporate veil. 142 As Professor
Leebron notes, however:
It is unclear what justifies the legal presumption against veil
piercing between related corporations on behalf of noncontractual
creditors. The mere fact of such relation ought, in theory, to create
the reverse presumption. Only where it can be shown that such
veil piercing would result in disintegration of similar enterprises
rather than liability should courts refrain from doing So.143
The primary reason for the presumption against corporate
veil piercing appears to be the deference afforded to the
corporate persona. However, in the case of involuntary tort
Unlike
creditors, Professor Leebron makes a valid point.
contractual creditors, tort victims do not know the often
This is
complicated corporate structure of their abusers.
especially true given the fact that multilayered corporations,
like Grace, often hold themselves out to the public as a single
entity. Thus, for the involuntary tort creditor, the issue becomes
why should they be required to abide by corporate formalities
which they had no idea even existed?

139.

See, e.g., RIBSTEIN & LETSOU, supra note 104, at § 3.05.

140.

See BOWKER, supra note 7.

141. Id.
142. See, e.g., Leebron, supra note 115, at 1619.
143. Id. See also Warsh, supra note 118, at 694 ("[t]he general rule is one of deference
to restructurings by corporate managers acting in good faith.").
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F. Pro Rata ShareholderLiability
Several legal scholars have argued that limited liability
should be replaced with pro rata shareholder liability. 14 4 Pro
rata liability is the theory that a shareholder should be liable for
a corporation's liabilities in proportion to the percentage of the
corporation which the shareholder owns. 145
Therefore, a
shareholder with a 10% interest in a corporation would be
personally liable for 10% of the corporation's liabilities. 46 The
argument for the necessity of such a profound shift in the law of
liability apportionment is relatively straightforward. Namely,
the present limited liability system "leaves tort creditors
uncompensated while shareholders are allowed to externalize
the costs of doing business and reap great profits at society's
47
expense."1
The pro rata argument is not without its difficulties. Most
notably, recovering against individual shareholders would be
complicated. 148
Furthermore, the rationale for limited
liability-reduced monitoring costs and fluidity of capital
investment-are all greatly diminished under a pro rata system.
While these problems cannot be avoided in the context of the
individual investor, they disappear entirely when the issue
becomes whether pro rata liability should be assessed to
corporate shareholders owning complete, or almost complete,
equity in the undercapitalized corporation. At this level, pro
rata liability becomes virtually indistinguishable from the
solution of removing the multiple layers of liability in the
parent-subsidiary context.
G. Prohibit Corporationsfrom Owning other Corporations
Although today the concepts of corporate personhood,
parent-subsidiary corporate relationships, and intercorporate
transactions are all fairly rooted, there was a time in which the

144. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability
for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1880 (1991); Leebron, supra note 106, at 1569.
145. See generally Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 133.
146.
147.

Id.
William J. Rands, Domination of a Subsidiary by a Parent, 32 IND. L. REV. 421,

424-25 (1999) (discussing Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 133).
148. For example, assume ten percent of a corporation is owned by a mutual fund. If
the corporation is unable to pay its creditors and pro rata liability is assessed, then the
mutual fund would be ten percent liable. But how do we gauge which individual mutual
fund investors should be held individually liable?
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legal system and society were apprehensive about extending the
powers of corporations too far. 149 Given the fear that existed,
lawmakers severely restricted both corporate purposes and
powers. 150 Over time, however, through a "race of laxity" among
the states, the scope of permissible corporate powers was greatly
broadened.1 5 1 One of the "new" powers given to corporations
was the ability to acquire shares in other corporations.1 52 This
power was expressly enumerated in the Revised Model Business
Corporation Act (MBCA), which provides in part:
Unless its articles of incorporation provide otherwise, every
corporation has perpetual duration and succession in its corporate
name and has the same powers as an individual to do all things
necessary or convenient to carry out its business and affairs,
without limitation to power: ... (6) to purchase, receive, subscribe
for, or otherwise acquire; own, hold, vote, use, sell, mortgage, lend,
shares or
pledge, or otherwise dispose of; and deal in and with
15 3
other interests in, or obligations of, any other entity.

In broadening corporate power to accommodate the
purchase and control of other corporations, the drafters of the
Model Act did not have a specific purpose in mind. Rather, the
allowance merely fell in line with the general philosophy of the
Model Act, "that corporations ... should be automatically
authorized to engage in all acts and have all powers that an

149. Summarizing the history of corporations as follows:
Although the value of this instrumentality in commerce and industry was fully
recognized, incorporation for business was commonly denied long after it had
been freely granted for religious, educational and charitable purposes. It was
Fear of encroachment on the liberties and
denied because of fear.
opportunities of the individual. Fear of the subjection of labor to capital. Fear
of monopoly. Fear that the absorption of capital by corporations, and their
perpetual life, might bring evils similar to those which attended mortmain.
There was a sense of some insidious menace inherent in large aggregations of
capital, particularly when held by corporations.
Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548-49 (1933).
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., Michael J. Gaertner, Note, Reverse Piercing the Corporate Veil: Should
CorporationOwners Have it Both Ways?, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 667, 671-72 (1989).
152. Noting as follows:
The crucial point in the evolution of the American corporation occurred in 1888
when New Jersey empowered a corporation to hold stock in another
corporation. Other states adopted similar laws shortly thereafter. This step
marked the birth of the modern corporation, a multilayered corporate
structure. Consequently, in the development of the American corporation 'a
corporation no longer always represented the entire enterprise.
Id.
153. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANNOTATED § 3.02 official cmt. (3rd ed. Supp. 1998/99).
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individual may have." 154 Thus, in one fell swoop, the drafters of
the Model Act had laid the foundation for all of the complicated
corporate maneuvering which we see today, from Grace to
Enron. 155 Allowing corporations to own other corporations led to
subsidiary corporations, which led to invulnerable layers of
limited liability and legally permissible corporate divestiture. It
also helped to create a tangled and complex body of law in the
area of fraudulent conveyances as creditors grappled with two
simple questions: who is liable and how can we make them pay?
Proponents of allowing corporations to own other
corporations might well argue that corporations, being legal
persons, should not be prohibited from engaging in activities
which individuals are not. In the end, however, the problems
inherent in allowing corporations to own other corporations far
outweigh the benefits. For example, a renewed prohibition on
corporate ownership of other corporations would immediately
protect creditors by assuring simple and understandable
answers to both of the above questions. 56 The simplicity such a
prohibition would create is undisputable. Corporate formation
would return to its most basically understood form, with the
corporation being controlled by its human shareholders.
Furthermore, resurrecting this prohibition would immediately
eliminate the confusing loopholes available in fraudulent
conveyance law. While perhaps the most simple solution offered
in this Part, prohibiting corporations from owning other
corporations would immediately create a system of simplicity
and fairness.
V. CONCLUSION

Grace's disregard toward the people of Libby is
unacceptable. If a human being had systematically injured or
killed the workers and residents of Libby, that person would be
in jail. Yet, because Grace is a corporate institution, it did not
go to jail. In fact, it did not even fully compensate its victims.
As the people of Libby grow sick and die, Grace lives on.
It would be too easy, however, to simply assign all the blame

154. Id.
155. Enron Corporation, then one of the largest energy providers in the country,
declared bankruptcy in 2001.
156. By the same logic, shareholders would also be protected because corporate
insiders would be unable to divert capital from the corporation to its subsidiaries (think
Enron).
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to Grace and consider it an enigma. The truth is, Grace is not
the only responsible party. In fact, the entire legal system has
failed the people of Libby. Their plight illustrates the grave
injustices which are inherent in current corporate law. The
current legal framework allows corporations to spinoff assets
and almost completely insulate themselves from the liability of
creditors. While commentators can argue about what exactly
can be done to better protect involuntary tort creditors, it is
indisputable that the current system is imperfect. Corporations
have striven for over 100 years to increase their powers and
rights. 157 They have, by all accounts, succeeded. But with
Determining and imposing
privileges come responsibilities.
these responsibilities, although no doubt a difficult task, is one
that must be undertaken with all of the zeal that corporations
had in gathering their rights and powers. The future Libbys of
the world demand it.

157.

See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 2; Mayer, supra note 2.
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